Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games by Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in
Coordination Games











Discussion Paper #2006-4 
 
Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria   
in Coordination Games 
  
by  
Toshimasa Maruta and Akira Okada 
October, 2006 
 Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria
in Coordination Games
Toshimasa Maruta1 and Akira Okada2
October 3, 2006
Abstract: In an (n,m)-coordination game, each of the n players has two alternative
strategies. A strategy generates positive payoﬀ only if there are at least m − 1 others who
choose the same, where m > n/2. The payoﬀ is nondecreasing in the number of such others
so that there are exactly two strict equilibria. Applying the adaptive play with mistakes
(Young 1993) to (n,m)-coordination games, we point out potential complications inherent
in many-person games. Focusing on games that admit simple analysis, we show that there
is a nonempty open set of (n,m)-coordination games that possess multiple stochastically
stable equilibria, which may be Pareto ranked, if and only if m > (n + 3)/2, which in turn
is equivalent to the condition that there is a strategy proﬁle against which every player has
alternative best responses.
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Many social and economic models have multiple equilibria. Whenever players face a “coordi-
nation” problem, they typically ﬁnd themselves in a game with multiple strict Nash equilibria.
Such a problem may arise in the context of collective decision making. One of the simplest
examples is the unanimity game, in which a particular policy can be implemented only if all the
participants unanimously agree. Imagine that there are two alternative policies, either of them
is preferred by everyone to the inaction, the status quo. If the collective decision is governed
by the unanimity rule, it gives rise to a game with two strict equilibria. One may consider this
situation as a prototypical example of the equilibrium selection problem, in that the game is
so simple but the problem it poses is genuine. In developing their theory, thus, Harsanyi and
Selten (1988) regarded the equilibrium selection in the unanimity game as a benchmark. For
unanimity games, their theory selects an equilibrium that maximizes the Nash product, i.e.,
the risk dominant equilibrium.
Another class of selection theories that receives attention is the stochastic evolution,1
developed by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993) and others. It is well known
that in a two-player two-strategy coordination game, theories agree in their selection outcome.
A majority of stochastic evolution models pick the same outcome, and it coincides with the
risk dominant equilibrium. In broader classes of games, however, the agreement collapses in a
drastic way. Not only that stochastic evolution need not select the risk dominant equilibrium,
but also that outcomes diﬀer within the class of stochastic evolution models. In fact, a stark
disagreement arises even in the class of many-person binary unanimity games.2
In one of the rare studies that focus on the stochastic equilibrium selection in many-
person stage games, Kim (1996), working in a single population random matching environment,
obtains a unique equilibrium selection for a symmetric n-person binary coordination game.
Thus, in a unanimity game, Kim (1996) selects the Pareto dominant equilibrium, which in this
case is equivalent to the risk dominant equilibrium. By contrast, Young (1998), working in
a multi-population random matching environment, points out by an example that there are
binary unanimity games with four or more players and non-degenerated payoﬀs, in which both
equilibria are stochastically stable. In particular, such an indeterminacy may occur even when
two equilibria are Pareto ranked.
In this paper, we characterize a class of n-person coordination games that have multiple
stochastically stable equilibria. As the equilibrium selection model, we adopt the adaptive play
1By a “stochastic evolution” model, we mean an equilibrium selection model formulated as a Markov chain
and analyzed by the notion of stochastic stability ` a la Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) or its adaptation by Young
(1993), or a closely related method.
2A strategic game is binary if every player has exactly two strategies.
1with mistakes, a perturbation of the ﬁctitious play with histories of a ﬁxed length, introduced by
Young (1993). Not only the result is of interest, but also an examination of the argument leading
to it suggests answers to the following questions, which arise naturally when one compares Kim
(1996) on one hand, and Young (1998) and the present paper on the other: What is the source
of the diﬀerent selection outcome?3 Is the indeterminacy speciﬁc to the unanimity rule per se?
How the number of players in the stage game aﬀects the stochastic stability analysis?
We apply the adaptive play with mistakes to the class of (n,m)-coordination games.4
Imagine a situation in which a group of n players has to make a collective decision over two
alternative policies. The decision rule stipulates that a policy can be implemented only if at
least m > n/2 members favor it. Once a policy has been implemented, the environment in
question allows those and only those who chose it to receive the positive payoﬀs. The payoﬀ
from the policy is nondecreasing in the size of its proponents so that there are exactly two strict
equilibria. A unanimity game is an (n,n)-coordination game. The intended interpretation of
an (n,m)-coordination games is a collective decision making on the provision of a club good,
as opposed to a public good. An alternative interpretation is that of a generalized n-person
bargaining, in the spirit of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Young (1998).
The best response structure of an (n,m)-coordination game depends on the relative mag-
nitude of n and m. For our purposes, it is worth pointing out that the game has a strategy
proﬁle against which all players have alternative best responses if and only if m > (n + 3)/2.
At such a proﬁle, best response behavior cannot point to any particular direction the adaptive
dynamics should move toward.
We show that if m > (n+3)/2, then there is an open set of (n,m)-coordination games on
which stochastic stability fails to discriminate the two equilibria. Conversely, if (n+3)/2 ≥ m,
then any multiplicity is non-generic, in that a slight perturbation of payoﬀs in the space of
(n,m)-coordination games would restore equilibrium selection one way or another. Therefore
an (n,m)-coordination game may have multiple stochastically stable equilibria if and only if it
has a strategy proﬁle at which none of the players is advised to choose any particular strategy
by the best response principle.
In general, each stochastic evolution model has a particular adjustment dynamics through
which the stage game is played. Authors have identiﬁed modeling details that may aﬀect the
nature of their selection outcome. Ellison (1993) shows that a local interaction shorten the
average waiting time to observe the stochastically stable outcome. Binmore, Samuelson, and
Vaughan (1995) pointed out Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) may diﬀer in their waiting
3While it is easy to point out the diﬀerence in the number of populations in Kim (1996) and Young (1998),
it is not clear how it relates to the diﬀerence in the selection outcome.
4Kim (1996, p.217) considers a similar class of games.
2time distributions. Bergin and Lipman (1996), Blume (2003), and Maruta (2002) examined
how the selection outcome depends on the way the vanishing rates of mistake vary on diﬀerent
states. Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) and Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998) show that it
depends on the way the payoﬀ information, based on which the strategies of the agents are
revised, is given. Our analysis shows that the selection outcome also depends on the variety
of probability distributions on the stage game strategy proﬁles that an agent might face in the
underlying adaptive dynamics. It turns out that the range of the distributions in the multi-
population random matching (Young 1998) or in the adaptive play (Young 1993) is much wider
than that in the single population model (Kim 1996). This accounts for the diﬀerent selection
results mentioned above.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we deﬁne a binary population game.
In such a game, each player has two strategies, her payoﬀ is increasing in the number of the
others who do the same, and the two unanimous strategy conﬁgurations are strict equilibria.
We apply the adaptive play with mistakes to the class of binary population games. The class
is much broader than that of (n,m)-coordination games. We start with this class in order
to point out potential complications one may face in identifying resistances in general many-
person games. In Section 3, we evaluate the resistance. We do this by introducing a linear
program, the optimal solution of which constitutes a lower bound of the resistance. Examining
the possible types of its optimal solution and its relationship to the resistance, we point out
complications speciﬁc in many-person games. We focus on a doubly simple binary population
game, in which the relevant linear program admits a simple solution and its value and the
resistance coincide. For such a game, the resistances are explicitly solved in terms of the payoﬀ
parameters. In Section 4, the results in Section 3 are applied to investigate the equilibrium
selection problem. First, we explain why and how the multiple stochastically stable equilibria
may arise in a binary population game. Subsequently, we show that there is an open set of
doubly simple (n,m)-coordination games that have multiple stochastically stable equilibria if
and only if m > (n + 3)/2. In Section 5, we discuss the relationship between the diﬀerences
in the speciﬁcs of the dynamics and those of the selection outcomes among representative
stochastic equilibrium selection models. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
There are n players, denoted by i ∈ I = {1,...,n}. Each player chooses her strategy σi from
{A,B}. σ ∈ Σ = {A,B}n and σ−i ∈ {A,B}n−1 denote a generic strategy proﬁle and a strategy
proﬁle of players other than i, respectively. Let |σ| be the number of A-players in σ and σ−i,





ai (|σ|), if σi = A,
bi (n − |σ|), if σi = B,
where ai(k) and bi(k) are functions deﬁned on {1,...,n} such that
• ai(k) and bi(k) are nondecreasing in k,
• ai(n) > bi(1) and bi(n) > ai(1).
The game thus deﬁned is called a binary population game. It is called symmetric if ai(k) = a(k)
and bi(k) = b(k) for every i ∈ I. It is called asymmetric if it is not symmetric.
An example of a binary population game is an (n,m)-coordination game, in which
ai(k) = bi(k) = 0 for every k < m,
where n and m are natural numbers such that n ≥ m > n/2. A unanimity game is an
(n,n)-coordination game.
By the second assumption on payoﬀs, both (A,...,A) and (B,...,B) are strict equilibria.
If the game is either symmetric or (n,m)-coordination, one can show that it has exactly two
strict equilibria. In Section 3, we discuss general binary population games. We simply assume
there that the game has exactly two strict equilibria.
As an equilibrium selection model, we adopt the adaptive play with mistakes, introduced
by Young (1993). We assume that the reader is familiar to the stochastic stability analysis in
general, and the adaptive play with mistakes in particular. For details, the reader is referred
to Young (1993). In what follows, the sizes of a history and of a sample are denoted by T
and s, respectively. Let A and B denote the T-fold repetition of (A,...,A) and (B,...,B),
respectively. We assume that s ≤ T/2. Under this assumption, one can show that in the
adaptive play without mistakes for an (n,m)-coordination game, starting from any state, ei-
ther A or B is reached with probability one. Thus the method of Young (1993) to identify
stochastically stable equilibria is applicable. In Section 3, we implicitly assume this for the
general binary population games. The resistance from A to B is denoted by r(A,B). r(B,A)
is the resistance for the other direction. (A,...,A) is uniquely stochastically stable if and only
if r(A,B) > r(B,A).
43 The resistance and the relevant linear program
3.1 Programs
Consider the adaptive play with mistakes for a binary population game. The current state is
A. In any path from A to B, there is a player who optimally chooses strategy B for the ﬁrst
time. Let us call that player a ﬁrst exitor. The ﬁrst exitor i ∈ I must have a sample against
which playing B is optimal. Such a sample must contain considerable number of Bs played
by others. Since player i is a ﬁrst exitor, all such Bs are mistakes. We are going to set up a
linear program that gives us the minimum number of mistaken Bs that i must face. Its optimal
solution not only gives us the number, but also reveals the way the mistaken Bs occur, a factor
that becomes signiﬁcant only in games played by three or more players.
Fix a player and let her stick with A. In the adaptive play, what matters are samples. A
sample is simply a set of strategy proﬁles that she observes. Speciﬁcally, we search for a sample
against which she can best respond by B, and we count the number of Bs (i.e., mistakes) in
it. The number of mistakes in the sample is the sum of the numbers of mistakes in constituent
proﬁles. In each proﬁle, in turn, the number of mistakes is at most n−1. In a two-person game,
it follows that the number of mistakes in the sample is equal to the number of proﬁles that
deviate from the original equilibrium. In many-person games, they diﬀer. A consequence is that
two samples may work quite diﬀerently even if they contain the same number of mistakes. Not
only the number, but also the distribution of mistakes matters. The linear program introduced
below takes care of the case in point. The relationship between its optimal value and the
resistance r(A,B) is clariﬁed in the next subsection.
Fix a player i ∈ I. Denote ak = ai(k) and bk = bi(k) for k = 1,...,n and set
zk = an − an−k + bk+1 − b1
for k = 1,...,n−1. Note that zk is nonnegative and nondecreasing in k. Although zk depends
on i ∈ I, we omit the superscript most of the time. The relevant program to solve is given as
follows:
minx1 + 2x2 + ··· + (n − 1)xn−1
s.t. x1 + ··· + xn−1 ≤ s,
Pn−1
k=1 zkxk ≥ s(an − b1), (Pi
A)
together with the nonnegativity condition x1 ≥ 0,...,xn−1 ≥ 0.5 In this program, xk is the
number of proﬁles in the sample that contain exactly k mistakes. x1+···+xn−1 is the number
5To be precise, we have to consider the integer constraint for xk, since the stochastic stability hinges on the
number of mistakes. Implicitly assuming that the sample size s is suﬃciently large, we ignore the rounding
problem throughout.
5of proﬁles that contain at least one mistake. The ﬁrst constraint comes from the fact that this
number cannot exceed the sample size. The second constraint expands into
bnxn−1 + ··· + b2x1 + (s −
Pn−1
k=1 xk)b1 ≥ a1xn−1 + ··· + an−1x1 + (s −
Pn−1
k=1 xk)an.
Thus it ensures that strategy B is a best response against the sample. The objective function
gives the total number of mistakes (i.e., Bs) in the sample. It is clear that (Pi
A) has an optimal
solution.6
Deﬁne kA = min{k | bk+1 ≥ an−k }. Here again, we omit the superscript most of the time
although kA depends on i ∈ I. In a single strategy proﬁle, strategy B is a best response for
the player in question if and only if there are other k ≥ kA players who choose B. If there
is j < kA then zj < an − b1. Thus if j < kA ≤ k then 0 ≤ zj < zk. Let (x1,...,xn−1) be a
feasible solution of (Pi
A). Its support is the set {k | xk > 0} of indices. When it is singleton,
we identify the set and its unique element. The next result characterizes conditions that ensure
an optimal solution with single support.7
Proposition 1. Consider the program (Pi
A) of a player i ∈ I in a binary population game.
Denote by λ1 and λ2 the Lagrange multipliers for the best response constraint and the sample
size constraint, respectively. The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) There is an optimal solution in which λ2 = 0.
































A), let ak and bk be interchanged and replace zk by wk, where
wk = bn − bn−k + ak+1 − a1,
6In a binary population game, what matters to each player is the number of other A-players and B-players.
Who takes which does not matter. This feature justiﬁes the formulation of (P
i
A).
7Note that the result allows the relevant program to have a single support optimal solution with λ2 > 0, in
which case it must be that xk∗ = s. It also permits xk∗ = s and λ2 = 0 to be optimal. One can construct
examples that possess these types of optimal solutions.
6and name the resulting program (Pi
B). It is the program that is relevant to evaluate the
resistance r(B,A) from B to A. For (Pi
B), the counterpart result to Proposition 1 follows.
For each i ∈ I, there are associated programs (Pi
A) and (Pi
B). They correspond to the
minimum number of mistakes when i is a ﬁrst exitor. Let iA be the player whose optimal
value of (Pi
A) is the smallest among i ∈ I. Intuitively, iA is the player who prefer equilibrium
(B,...,B) most. In what follows, set (PA) = (P
iA
A ) and deﬁne (PB) analogously.
In asymmetric games, (PA) and (PB) belong to diﬀerent players in general. We always
assume that the optimal value of iA is strictly less than those of the others so that slight
perturbation of iA’s payoﬀ parameters would not alter the status of iA. The same assumption
is made for iB.
Deﬁnition. A binary population game is simple if both (PA) and (PB) have optimal solutions
with λ2 = 0.
Simple binary population games inherit a tractable property from two-person games. Imag-
ine the adaptive play over a two-person strategic game and ﬁnd a sample with the least number
of mistakes that allows an optimal switch from an equilibrium to another. Unless the destina-
tion equilibrium involves a weakly dominated strategy, we know that the least mistake sample
contains one or more original equilibrium proﬁles. Is this also true in a game with many play-
ers? Since there is no dominance relationship between two strategies, we know for sure that
there are samples containing one or more original proﬁles that allow the switch. We do not
know, however, whether the least mistake sample can be found within such type of samples.
Every proﬁle in the least mistake sample may well contain a mistake. This occurs if (PA) has
no optimal solution with λ2 = 0.8 Viewed thus, a simple binary population game is “simple”
in that the least mistake sample for the game looks “similar” to that for a two-person game.
Examples below should make the issue clear. In Figure 1 and similar ones, a strategy with an
asterisk denotes one by mistake.
Example 1. Consider the following symmetric (4,3)-coordination game:
(a3,a4 : b3,b4) = (3,4 : 2,6).













8This is not to say that if λ2 = 0 then the least mistake sample contains a proﬁle without mistake. In fact,
our results in the next section hinge on the fact that in some games the relevant program has an optimal solution
in which λ2 = 0 but the corresponding sample size constraint binds.










1 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A X ··· X
σ
2 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A X ··· X
σ
3 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A X ··· X
σ
4 A ··· A A ··· A B ··· B B ··· B














∗ X ··· X
σ
2 B ··· B A
∗ ··· A
∗ B ··· B X ··· X
σ
3 B ··· B B ··· B B ··· B A ··· A
σ
4 B ··· B B ··· B B ··· B A ··· A
Figure 2: A non-simple optimal solution of (PB).
Therefore there is an optimal solution of (PA) with single support x3 = 2s/5. A sample
corresponding to it is depicted in Figure 1, in which i = 4 is the ﬁrst exitor. One can verify
that Program (PB) also satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 1. Thus the game is simple.
Example 2. For the following symmetric (4,3)-coordination game
(a3,a4 : b3,b4) = (3,4 : 1,6),























is an optimal solution. A sample corresponding to it is depicted in Figure 2, in which i = 3,4
are the ﬁrst exitors.
3.2 Evaluating resistances
By construction, the optimal value of (PA) is a lower bound of the resistance r(A,B). The
optimal value is exactly equal to the resistance in some games, but it is strictly less in others.














1 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A X ··· X B ··· B B ··· B
σ
2 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A X ··· X B ··· B B ··· B
σ
3 A ··· A A ··· A B ··· B B ··· B B ··· B B ··· B
σ
4 A ··· A A ··· A B ··· B B ··· B B ··· B B ··· B
Figure 3: A path from A to B
This is another salient feature of games with three or more players. To see this, let us go back
to Example 1 and Figure 1. During Phase 4, let i = 1,2,3 sample Phases 2 and 3. Since
each of them is observing strictly less number of mistakes than program (PA) indicates, the
unspeciﬁed action X in Phase 4 is actually A. It is clear that without further mistakes there
will be no sample that rationalizes them playing B. In order to reach state B, more mistakes
are needed. That is, the resistance r(A,B) is greater than the optimal value of (PA).9
In other games, the resistance and the optimal value coincide.
Example 3. Consider a symmetric four-person binary population game in which
(a1,a2,a3,a4 : b2,b2,b3,b4) = (2,3,6,7 : 0,1,5,8).












solve (PA) and (PB), respectively. Figure 3 depicts a transition from A to B. The sample
assignments are as follows. In Phase 4, sample for player 1 and 2 are not speciﬁed. Players 3
and 4 sample Phases 2 and 3. In Phase 5, players 1 and 2 sample Phases 3 and 4. Players 3
and 4 sample Phases 2 and 3. In Phase 6, players 1 and 2 sample Phases 4 and 5. Players 3 and
4 sample the ﬁnal available segment of Phase 2, Phase 5, and the initial segment of Phase 6.
These assignments are possible since s ≤ T/2. Each player best responds against the sample.
The key is that in Phase 5, players 1 and 2 are observing a block of Bs in the right shape that
is dictated by the optimal solution of (PA).
This example should convince us that in a symmetric simple n-person binary popula-
tion game, where n is even, if the single support indices of the two programs are k = n/2,
9It is clear from Figure 1 that in a simple binary population game that is symmetric, s(k
∗ + 1)(an − b1)/zk∗
is an upper bound of the resistance. In the Appendix, we derive a tighter upper bound.
9b(n+2)/2 ≥ an/2, and a(n+2)/2 ≥ bn/2, then the resistances are equal to the optimal values of
the relevant programs. This observation, in turn, explains why the property holds in any two-
person coordination game, with or without symmetric payoﬀ. In this sense, the class of games
deﬁned by the property is a natural generalization of two-person coordination games.
Deﬁnition. A simple binary population game, with or without symmetric payoﬀ, is doubly
simple if r(A,B) is equal to the optimal value of (PA) and r(B,A) is equal to the optimal value
of (PB).
In a doubly simple game, one can circumscribe potential complications inherent in many-
person games.
4 Equilibrium selection in (n,m)-coordination Games
4.1 Insensitivity of the resistance to payoﬀ parameters
Young (1998) found that in a unanimity game the resistances can be insensitive to equilib-
rium payoﬀs and that this leads to multiple stochastically stable equilibria. It turns out that
insensitivity and multiplicity can arise in a broader class of games. Having established the
relationship between the resistance and the relevant linear program, we are ready to explain
why and when the resistances may become insensitive to the payoﬀ parameters.
Consider a simple binary population game. Let ξ be the optimal solution of (PA) described
in Proposition 1, in which the unique support is k∗. Assume that the envelope theorem is
applicable at ξ.10 Then as a function of payoﬀ parameters, the derivatives of the optimal value



















and all the other derivatives are zero. The mirror image equations for the program (PB) also
follow.11 By Proposition 1, k∗ ≥ kA. Thus by deﬁnition of kA, bk∗+1 ≥ an−k∗.
It is important to notice that there are only four payoﬀ parameters, when perturbed, that
possibly aﬀect the optimal value. Speciﬁcally, while bk∗+1 and an−k∗ directly aﬀect it, an or b1
10If k
∗ is a unique maximizer in condition (2) of Proposition 1, then ξ is a unique solution of (PA), in which
case we can apply the envelope theorem at ξ.
11If iA 6= iB (see paragraphs that follow Proposition 1), then perturbation of iA’s payoﬀ has no eﬀect on the
optimal value of (PB), and vice versa. If iA = iB or the game is symmetric, then the perturbation may aﬀect
both.
10does only if the ﬁrst two diﬀer. Note that bk∗+1 = an−k∗ means that at the strategy proﬁle in
which exactly k∗ others play B, both A and B are best responses of iA. Therefore, insensitivity
of the resistance necessarily involves multiple best responses in the stage game.
These observations imply that in a doubly simple binary population game, if all the payoﬀ
parameters are allowed to vary, then generically there is a unique stochastically stable equilib-
rium. As typical in games that embody collective decision rules of the majority-rule variety,
however, there are games in which some of the payoﬀ parameters are deﬁned to be constant.
What if the index k∗ is such that both an−k∗ and bk∗+1 have to be, say, zero by the underlying
decision rule? Then they are not allowed to be perturbed and no permissible payoﬀ perturba-
tion would change the value of the resistance. This leads to a failure of equilibrium selection
by means of stochastic stability. This possibility is actual in the class of (n,m)-coordination
games. For expository purpose, we start with unanimity games.
4.2 Unanimity games












n, for k = 1,...,n − 2,
ai
n + bi
n, for k = n − 1.
It follows that kA = 1. Therefore (Pi
A) has a single support optimal solution described in
Proposition 1. That is, unanimity games are simple. Proposition 1 implies that if 1/ai
n is no
more than (n − 1)/(ai
n + bi
n) for every i ∈ I, then the optimal value of (PA) is s. Otherwise,
it is s(n − 1)ai
n/(ai
n + bi
n), which is strictly less than s. In either case, the optimal value and
the resistance coincide, since by the unanimity rule an s-consecutive play of single deviation
is enough for everyone to switch optimally. That is, the unanimity game is doubly simple.12
Thus we have the following result.










for every i ∈ I, then r(A,B) = s.









12This would be clear from modifying Figure 6, which will appear in the next subsection to demonstrate a




A if α > β
B if β > α
Figure 4: Stochastically stable equilibria in a unanimity game.








The analogous results (B1) and (B2) follow for the resistance r(B,A).
















The diagonal cases in Figure 4 are of interest. First, if both (A1) and (B1) apply, then the
stochastic stability fails to discriminate the two equilibria. When do they apply? It is easy to
see that when n = 3, they are simultaneously satisﬁed only if ai
n = bi
n for every i ∈ I. Hence for
three-person unanimity games, the stochastic stability selects one or the other in every game
of interest. In contrast, if n ≥ 4 then they place only very loose restriction on the equilibrium
payoﬀs. Speciﬁcally, (A1) and (B1) apply if and only if bi
n ≤ (n − 2)ai
n and ai
n ≤ (n − 2)bi
n, a
pair of very generous conditions, and they become more so as n increases. In particular, both
equilibria can be stochastically stable even if one of them Pareto-dominates the other.
Second, if (A2) and (B2) apply, then there is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium,
which is determined by the risk dominance in a two-strategy two-player unanimity game played
by the distinguished two players, iA and iB. It should be noted, however, that the unique
outcome may not be risk dominant in the original game.








Player 1 prefers the former equilibrium, but the others prefer the latter. Comparing Nash prod-
ucts, we know that (B,B,B) is risk dominant. On the other hand, it follows from Proposition
2 that (A,A,A) is uniquely stochastically stable since (A,A) is risk dominant in the two-player
game, depicted in Figure 5, that is played by iA = 2 and iB = 1.













Figure 5: A two-person unanimity game.









σ1 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A B ··· B
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
σn−m+1 A ··· A B
∗ ··· B
∗ A ··· A B ··· B
σn−m+2 A ··· A A ··· A B ··· B B ··· B
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
σn A ··· A A ··· A B ··· B B ··· B
Figure 6: A path from A to B.
One can verify that (A2) and (B2) still apply, so (A,...,A) is uniquely stochastically stable.
In the analogous ﬁve-person game, however, they no longer apply but (A1) and (B1) do. Thus
the indeterminacy occurs.
In general, even if a unique selection outcome may be obtained in a “small”-person game,
“replicating” it with respect to players eventually leads to multiplicity.
4.3 Multiple stochastically stable equilibria in (n,m)-coordination games
By deﬁnition of an (n,m)-coordination game, m > n/2. In this subsection, we consider games








   
   
ai
n − ai
n−k, for k = 1,...,n − m,
ai
n, for k = n − m + 1,...,m − 2,
ai
n + bi
k+1, for k = m − 1,...,n − 1,
(?)
and wi
k is given by ﬂipping ai
k and bi
k. Note that m ≥ (n + 3)/2 implies n − m + 1 < m − 1.
Thus there is at least one k such that zi
k = ai
n. It follows that kA ≤ n − m + 1.
Inspecting (?), if xn−m+1 = s solves (Pi
A), then by Proposition 1 the optimal value of (Pi
A)
is (n − m + 1)s, a value that depends on neither the players nor the payoﬀ parameters. If this
is true for some i ∈ I, then (n−m+1)s is an upper bound of the resistance r(A,B). In Figure
136, let i ∈ {1,...,n − m + 1} and j ∈ {n − m + 2,...,n}. In Phase 3, let j sample Phase 2.
Then both A and B are best responses since n − m + 2 < m. In Phase 4, let i sample Phase
3. Then i can choose B since respective strategies yields bi
m ≥ 0 and ai
n−m+1 = 0. Letting j
sample the ﬁnal available segment of Phase 2 and the initial segment of Phase 4, we make her
choose B in Phase 6 as well. In this way, an s-consecutive (B,...,B) arises. It follows that if
k = n − m + 1 is the single support solution index of (Pi
A) and (Pi
B) for every i ∈ I, then the
game is doubly simple and the two resistances are equal to (n−m+1)s. Formally, the crucial
condition is given by





















for every i ∈ I. (M)
The question is, therefore, when this can be true. It turns out that if m > (n+3)/2 then there
is an open set of (n,m)-coordination games in which (M) is satisﬁed.
A sequence of nonempty open intervals γ1,γ2,...,γK in R is strictly increasing if every
element of γk is strictly less than every element of γk+1.
Proposition 3. If m > (n + 3)/2, then there are strictly increasing nonempty open intervals
αm,αm+1,...,αn and βm,βm+1,...,βn of positive numbers such that for every ai
k ∈ αk and
bi







n)i∈I is doubly simple in which both equilibria are stochastically stable.
4.4 Characterizing multiplicity
An (n,m)-coordination game has generic payoﬀ if both ai
m and bi
m are positive, ai
n and bi
n
diﬀer, and both ai
k and bi
k are strictly increasing in k ≥ m. With generic payoﬀ, we can prove
a sort of converse to Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Let there be a simple (n,m)-coordination game with generic payoﬀ such that
the optimal values of (PA) and (PB) coincide. If m ≤ (n + 3)/2, then a slight perturbation of
payoﬀ results in another (n,m)-coordination game in which the optimal values diﬀer.
Proposition 3 and 4 characterize multiplicity in the class of doubly simple13 (n,m)-coordi-
nation games: there is an open set of games with multiple stochastically stable equilibria if and
only if (n+3)/2 > m. The latter condition, in turn, is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
an (n,m)-coordination game to have a strategy proﬁle against which both strategies are best
responses for every player. Thus the characterization indicates a close relationship between
multiplicity of equilibria and of best responses.
13We are simply assuming that after the slight payoﬀ perturbation the game remains to be doubly simple.
145 Concluding Remarks
Working in the adaptive play with mistakes, we have characterized the indeterminacy in doubly
simple (n,m)-coordination games. Our analysis have shown that it is not speciﬁc to unanimity
games but may present itself in games with alternative best responses. The result should be
compared with Kim (1996), in which a unique selection result for binary coordination games
has been obtained, and Young (1998), where the possibility of indeterminacy in unanimity
games has been pointed out. In what follows, we reconcile the diﬀerent selection results that
may appear to be contradicting each other.
Stochastic evolution models vary in their own speciﬁc adjustment dynamics through which
the stage game is played. Nonetheless, it is possible to describe a general structure. Typically,
the dynamics run as follows.14 There is a mapping f from its state space Z into the set
∆(Σ) of all probability distributions on the set Σ of stage game pure strategy proﬁles. At
state z ∈ Z, each player may or may not best respond against the probability distribution
f(z) ∈ ∆(Σ). Their strategies determine the next state. Naturally, diﬀerent models generate
diﬀerent mappings. For equilibrium selection, the range of the mapping f matters.
Take an n-person symmetric binary unanimity game and consider its static best response.
By the unanimity rule, both strategies are best responses to a strategy proﬁle in which everyone
but exactly one chooses the same. In a primitive sense, therefore, the minimum number of
deviations to upset either equilibrium is one. This is deﬁnitely one of the forces working
behind the indeterminacy result.15 In order for this feature to translate into the selection
outcome, it seems necessary and suﬃcient that there is a state z such that the corresponding
distribution f(z) places probability one to the one-deviation proﬁle.
There is such a state in the adaptive play with mistakes. Setting n = m in Figure 6, agents
i = 2,...,n are observing the one-deviation proﬁle with certainty. This is also true if the game
is played, as in Young (1998), through a multi-population random matching. In such a model,
there are n diﬀerent populations, each of which is the set of agents that act as one of the players
in the stage game. Consider a state in which every agent in n−1 populations chooses the same
strategy but every agent in the remaining population chooses the other. Then every agent in
the n − 1 populations is observing the one-deviation proﬁle with probability one. In fact, it is
clear in both models that for each pure strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ there is a state z such that f(z)
places the unit mass on σ. This observation leads to the conjecture that results analogous to
14The description covers at least representative models such as the single population random matching, the
multi-population random matching, and the adaptive play with mistakes. For the latter, a state should be
reﬁned to include a proﬁle of sample assignments to the agents.
15We say “one of the forces” here since if it were the only one then the indeterminacy would occur in every
unanimity game.
15ours should be true in a multi-population random matching environment.
By contrast, there is no such state if the game is played, as in Kim (1996), through a single
population random matching mechanism. In such a model, the state space is {0,1,...,N},
where N > n is the population size and each state represents the number of agents who choose
a particular action. Consider state N − 1, in which exactly one agent plays diﬀerently. In this
state, everyone except the deviator faces the probability distribution f(N − 1) in which the
















. It is clear that there is no state z such that f(z) places probability one to the
one-deviation proﬁle.16 This is the source of the diﬀerence between the adaptive play and the
multi-population matching on one hand, and the single population random matching on the
other.17 In this way, the range of the mapping f aﬀects the selection outcome of the stochastic
equilibrium selection.
One might be tempted to think that binary coordination games are particularly simple
class of games. As far as equilibrium selection is concerned, such a view may be ill-founded.
The selection outcome of a binary coordination game is by no means obvious.18
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the dual program of (PA):
maxs(an − b1)λ1 − sλ2
17s.t. z1λ1 − λ2 ≤ 1, ..., zkλ1 − λ2 ≤ k, ..., zn−1λ1 − λ2 ≤ n − 1, (DA)
together with the nonnegativity condition λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. By the duality theorem, nonneg-
ative vectors (x1,...,xn−1) and (λ1,λ2) are optimal solutions of (PA) and (DA), respectively,
if and only if
• Primal Feasibility: (x1,...,xn−1) is a feasible solution of (PA),
• Dual Feasibility: (λ1,λ2) is a feasible solution of (DA),
• Complementary Slackness:
– For each xk, if xk > 0 then zkλ1 − k = λ2,
– If λ1 > 0, then
Pn−1
k=1 zkxk = s(an − b1),
– If λ2 > 0, then
Pn−1
k=1 xk = s.
Since (3) implies (1), it suﬃces to show the following two implications.




















Assume that kj < kA for every j = 1,...,l. Then zkj < an − b1 by the deﬁnition of kA. Thus
zk1xk1 + ··· + zklxkl < (an − b1)xk1 + ··· + (an − b1)xkl
= (an − b1)(x1 + ··· + xn) ≤ s(an − b1).
Therefore
P
k zkxk < s(an − b1) since xk > 0 implies k = kj for some j = 1,...,l. But this
contradicts the complementary slackness since λ1 > 0. Therefore there is k∗ ≥ kA such that
k∗/zk∗ = mink,zk6=0 k/zk.
(2) ⇒ (3). Consider the solution given in (3). Nonnegativity constraints are all satisﬁed.
Since an−k∗ ≤ bk∗+1, zk∗ ≥ an − b1, which implies xk∗ ≤ s. Thus (x1,...,xn−1) is primal
feasible. Since λ∗
2 = 0, the dual constraint is given by zkλ∗




2) is dual feasible. It is straightforward to verify complementary
slackness. Thus the solution is optimal by the duality theorem.
18A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove Proposition 3, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a parameter set (am,am+1,...,an : bm,bm+1,...,bn) for an (n,m)-
coordination game such that m ≥ (n + 3)/2. (M) in Section 4.3 holds true if and only if
ηn−kan ≤ ak ≤ ηk−1bn and ηn−kbn ≤ bk ≤ ηk−1an (†)
for k = m,m + 1,...,n, where
ηj =
|n − m + 1 − j|
n − m + 1
, j ∈ {0,1,...,n − m} ∪ {m − 1,...,n − 1}.19
Proof. It suﬃces to consider (PA) only. We are looking for a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for








We have discussed unanimity games in Section 4.2. In what follows, thus, we assume n−m ≥ 1.
In an (n,m)-coordination game with m ≥ (n + 3)/2,
zk =

   
   
an − an−k, for k = 1,...,n − m,
an, for k = n − m + 1,...,m − 2,
an + bk+1, for k = m − 1,...,n − 1.
Assume (A.1). Then for every k ≤ n − m such that an > an−k,






which is equivalent to
(n − m + 1 − k)an ≤ (n − m + 1)an−k.
Hence,
ηkan ≤ an−k, where ηk =
n − m + 1 − k
n − m + 1
. (A.2)
Since ηk ≤ 1, (A.2) is true, a posteriori, every k ≤ n − m such that an = an−k. Thus we have
(A.2) for every k = 1,...,n − m. By changing the variable and noting that η0 = 1, we have
ηn−kan ≤ ak for every k = m,...,n.
Similarly, (A.1) implies





19Since m ≥ (n + 3)/2, n − m + 1 < m − 1. Thus the numerator of ηj never be zero.
19for every k = m − 1,...,n − 1,20 which is equivalent to
(n − m + 1)bk+1 ≤ (k − n + m − 1)an.
Thus
bk+1 ≤ ηkan, where ηk =
k − n + m − 1
n − m + 1
for every k = m − 1,...,n − 1. By changing the variable, we have bk ≤ ηk−1an for every
k = m,...,n. Thus we have ηn−kan ≤ ak and bk ≤ ηk−1an for every k = m,...,n, the half of
the inequalities in (†). Conversely, it is clear that these two imply (A.1).
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3.
Proof. Let us say that a sequence of nonempty open intervals δ1,δ2,...,δK in R is weakly
increasing if inf δk < inf δk+1. It is clear that if δ1,δ2,...,δK is weakly increasing then there
are nonempty open intervals γk ⊂ δk such that γ1,γ2,...,γK is strictly increasing.
By the preceding observation and Lemma 1, it suﬃces to construct weakly increasing
sequences of nonempty open intervals αm,...,αn and βm,...,βn of positive numbers that
satisfy the following.
(B.1) an ≤ ηn−1bn and bn ≤ ηn−1an for every (an,bn) ∈ αn × βn.
(B.2) For every (an,bn) ∈ αn × βn,
αk ⊂ [ηn−kan, ηk−1bn] and βk ⊂ [ηn−kbn, ηk−1an]
for every k = m,m + 1,...,n − 1.
Let m > (n + 3)/2. Then
η1 =
n − m
n − m + 1
< 1 <
m − 2
n − m + 1
= ηn−1.
One can verify that under this condition we can choose e > e > 0 such that









< ηn−1 for every an,bn ∈ (e,e).




k − n + m − 2
k − m + 1
20Note that m − 1 > kA.






for every k = m,...,n − 1. Therefore
ηn−kan < ηn−ke < ηk−1e < ηk−1bn
for every k = m,...,n − 1 and every (an,bn) ∈ αn × βn. Setting
αk = βk = (ηn−ke,ηk−1e),
we have (B.2).
It remains to show that αm,...,αn is weakly increasing. Since ηn−k is strictly increasing
in k, inf αk = ηn−ke < ηn−k−1e = inf αk+1 for k = m,...,n−2. Together with (B.3), it follows
that αm,...,αn is weakly increasing.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let a simple (n,m)-coordination game with generic payoﬀ be given. Assume that the
optimal values vA and vB of (PA) and (PB) to be equal. In Section 4.1 we saw that vA is
a decreasing function of bk∗+1, where k∗ is the single support optimal solution of (PA). If
k∗ + 1 ≥ m, then by generic payoﬀ bk∗+1 < bk∗+2. Thus we can increase bi
k∗+1 to decrease vA
but to weakly increase vB.21 Hence it suﬃces to show that k∗ ≥ m − 1.
If m ≤ (n + 2)/2, then n − (m − 2) ≥ m. Thus bi
(m−2)+1 < ai
n−(m−2) by generic payoﬀ.
Therefore the deﬁnition of kA implies that m−1 ≤ kA ≤ k∗. The case that m = (n+3)/2 only
remains. In this case, kA = n−m+1 = m−2 = (n−1)/2 (see (?) in the opening paragraph of
Section 4.3). Assume that k∗ = m − 2. Then it follows from the ﬁrst equation in (M) (Section
















n. Thus if, in addition, k∗∗, the support of (PB), is also m − 2, then
ai
n = bi
n for every i ∈ I. But such a case is excluded by generic payoﬀ assumption. Thus
max{k∗,k∗∗} ≥ m − 1. By renaming the payoﬀ parameters if necessary, we can conclude that
k∗ ≥ m − 1.
A.4 An upper bound of the resistance
Even if the resistance r(A,B) and the optimal value of (PA) diﬀer the latter is still useful in
deriving an upper bound of the former if the game is symmetric.
21If (PA) and (PB) belong to the same player i ∈ I, as they would in a symmetric game, then an increase of
bk∗+1 would change vB as well. But we know that ∂LB/∂bk, the partial of the Lagrangian of (PB), is nonnegative.
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Figure 7: A path from A to B.
To derive the upper bound, take a simple and symmetric binary population game and let
the unique support solution be given by x = s(an − b1)/zk. Consider the sequence of events
depicted in Figure 7. At the beginning of Phase 1, the current state of the adaptive play is
A, which we call Phase zero. In Phase 1, everyone best responds to Phase zero, plays A. In
Phase 2, players i = 1,...,k make mistakes as exactly as the solution of (PA) indicates. Players
i = k+2,...,n best respond to Phase zero. Pay a special attention to player k+1, who makes
mistakes in Phase 2t but best responds in Phase 21−t, where t ∈ [0,1]. In Phase 3, each player
samples Phases 1 and 2 and best responds. The number of Bs that players i = 1,...,k face
is weakly less than the optimal value of (PA).22 Thus they can choose A. Player k + 1 faces
the solution of (PA). Thus she can chooses B. Players i = k + 2,...,n face the solution of
(PA) with some extra Bs. Therefore they choose B. In Phase 4, each player samples Phases
2 and 3 and best responds. Since players i = k + 1,...,n see more Bs than in Phase 3, they
continue playing B. In contrast, what players i = 1,...,k choose depends on t. They choose B
if g(t) ≥ 0, where
g(t) = {(s − x)bn−k+1 + txbk+1 + (1 − t)xbk} − {(s − x)ak + txan−k + (1 − t)xan−k+1}.
It may well be the case that g(0) ≥ 0. In this case, the resistance r(A,B) is equal to the
optimal value of (PA). Even if g(0) < 0, there is t ∈ (0,1] such that g(t) ≥ 0. This is because
by plugging x = s(an − b1)/zk in , we have
(s − x)b1 + xbk+1 = (s − x)an + xan−k.
By monotonicity of payoﬀ parameters, it follows that
(s − x)bn−k+1 + xbk+1 ≥ (s − x)ak + xan−k,
22In other words, if t < 1 they face a strictly less number of Bs so that they must choose A. If t = 1, they
face the optimal solution so that A and B are alternative best responses. Recall that we ignore rounding issues.
22which means that g(1) ≥ 0. Therefore if t ≥ t∗ = min{t ∈ [0,1] | g(t) ≥ 0}, everyone can play
B in Phase 4. In Phase 5, each player samples Phases 3 and 4. By monotonicity again, everyone
continues playing B. Note that this sequence of events can happen with positive probability




s(k + t∗)(an − b1)
zk
.
It does not appear to be straightforward to bound the resistance any tighter. Note that the
argument that leads to this inequality depends on the symmetric payoﬀ assumption in several
steps.
23